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WHEN LAW MIGRATES: REFUGEES IN COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
Jill I. Goldenziel* 
 
As record numbers of migrants have fled their countries in recent years, 
wealthier states have had an increasing interest in restricting their borders 
to protect national security. The challenge of balancing domestic security 
interests with international human rights commitments has fallen to courts. 
Drawing on cases from the U.S., Australia, and the European Court of 
Human Rights, this chapter will compare how the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees has been interpreted across countries and 
over time. It will show how courts have permitted countries to circumvent 
the core prohibition of the Refugee Convention, and discuss when courts 
choose to intervene to enforce it. The chapter will conclude by analyzing the 
implications of these cases for extraterritorial application of domestic and 
international human rights guarantees.  
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
Hugo Grotius famously said that the sea lies beyond the reach of 
sovereignty.1 Yet sovereignty over vessels on the high seas has long been 
contested. The practice of interdiction at sea has been particularly 
controversial in recent years. In this law enforcement activity, states’ 
military or police vehicles halt irregular migrants before they reach land and 
return them to their country of departure.2 Faced with increasing migration, 
wealthy states have employed interdiction at sea to avoid their own 
stringent immigration rules and processes. States may also use this practice 
to circumvent their international legal obligations to asylum-seekers and 
refugees.3  
                                                
* Research Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, International Security Program, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs. Ph.D., Government, Harvard University; 
A.M., Government, Harvard University; J.D., New York University School of Law; A.B., 
Princeton University. Thanks to Noah Feldman, Anthea Roberts, Kevin Rudd, Michael 
Pine, Mila Versteeg, and participants in the 2014 Sokol Colloquium in International Law at 
the University of Virginia. 
1 See Hugo Grotius, THE FREE SEA (David Armitage, ed., Richard Hakluyt, trans.,  
Liberty Fund, 2004). 
2 Anja Klug & Tim Howe, The Concept of State Jurisdiction and the Applicability of 
the Non-Refoulement Principle to Extraterritorial Interception Measure, in 
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL: LEGAL CHALLENGES, 69, 69–70 (Bernard 
Ryan & Valsamis Mitsilegas, eds., 2010). 
3 See id. 
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The primary international legal issue involved with interdiction at 
sea is whether it violates the principle of non-refoulement, or not returning a 
refugee back to a place where his or her life would be endangered. Non-
refoulement lies at the core of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to which the U.S., Australia, and nearly all 
European states are parties.4 The principle is considered by most 
commentators to have acquired the status of a jus cogens norm.5 The 
Convention exempts states from the obligation of non-refoulement only 
when individual refugees present national security threats, or when an 
asylum-seeker has been involved in war crimes or criminal acts.6 
International refugee law thus conflicts with the right of a sovereign state to 
expel aliens, and demands that states give certain protections to non-
citizens. 
Faced with tremendous numbers of people wishing to enter, 
wealthier states have increasingly restricted their borders to protect national 
security. The challenge of balancing domestic security interests with 
international human rights commitments has fallen to courts. Cases 
involving interdiction at sea and non-refoulement have reached the highest 
courts of the U.S., Australia, and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR).8 Each court has interpreted international refugee law differently 
in its jurisprudence, creating a discrepancy as to what non-refoulement 
actually requires. The U.S. and Australian courts have determined that their 
practices of interdiction at sea did not violate non-refoulement or their own 
domestic laws involving refugee protection. Most recently, the ECtHR 
determined that the European Union’s practices of interdiction at sea did 
violate the principle of non-refoulement, forcing the EU to change its 
policies. International refugee law, and these courts’ interpretations of it, 
continuously plays a major role in shaping the refugee and asylum law of 
nation-states. As states continue to develop creative solutions to manage 
migration, domestic courts will play an increasing role in interpreting 
international refugee law.  
This article will analyze how the concept of non-refoulement has 
been treated in domestic courts. Drawing on cases from the U.S., Australia, 
                                                
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 33, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137 (hereinafter, “Convention”); 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 
1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (hereinafter, “1967 Protocol”). The U.S. is a party to the 1967 
Protocol, which incorporates the Convention.  
5 See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature of Non-Refoulement, 13 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 
533 (2001). 
6 Convention at arts. 1(F)(a)–(b). 
8 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (hereinafter, “HCC”); Ruddock 
v Vadarlis (2001) FCA 1329 (Austl.); Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, 27765/09, 2012 Eur. 
Ct. H.R.; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 30696/09, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
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and the ECtHR, this article will compare how the Convention has been 
interpreted across countries and over time. Its object is to compare how the 
Convention and its core principle of non-refoulement have been creatively 
avoided and interpreted by courts. Comparing state jurisprudence on this 
topic helps determine what international refugee law actually requires of 
states.9 More broadly, this analysis sheds light on the question of what 
extraterritorial obligations human rights law requires. 
This article fits squarely within the internal perspective on 
comparative international law.10 It employs the techniques of comparative 
law to illuminate our understanding of what international refugee law, 
although ostensibly uniform, means when applied in various jurisdictions. 
These country cases were selected because they are common asylum 
destinations for migrants traveling by sea.11 Moreover, their state practice 
has been influential in the development of international law, particularly 
refugee law, and the cases’ fact patterns present similar circumstances that 
enable useful cross-jurisdictional comparison.  
This article will proceed in three parts. Part I will discuss the 
tensions between the principle of non-refoulement and practices of 
interdiction at sea. Part II will review major cases that have reached high 
courts in the U.S., Australia, and Europe in recent years. Part III will 
analyze the problems that differing interpretations of non-refoulement 
creates within the international human rights regime, and conclude with the 
implications of these cases for understanding the extraterritorial reach of 
human rights law. 
 
 
I. THE OBLIGATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The Convention’s obligation of non-refoulement binds its 146 signatory 
states not to return to his country of origin anyone who meets the 
Convention definition of refugee, or any asylum-seeker awaiting refugee 
status determination. Non-refoulement does not require states to allow 
asylum-seekers to enter; it only requires that refugees not be returned to a 
place where they would be endangered. Most state practice has supported 
the idea that non-refoulement means non-return and non-rejection at the 
                                                
9 While executive or legislative interpretations of Convention, or national legislation 
implementing it, may also exist, discussion of these important units of analysis for 
Comparative International Law lies beyond the scope of this chapter. 
10 See Paul Stephan et al., Introduction, in PAUL STEPHAN, ET AL., EDS., COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015). 
11 See Katerina Linos, Lessons for Comparative Law from Comparative Politics, in Id. 
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border.13 However, where exactly those borders begin is unclear when 
migrants are interdicted at sea.  
In the modern environment of mass migration, compliance with the 
Refugee Convention creates a tremendous burden for states. The 
requirement of protection while claims are being processed has 
overwhelmed legal infrastructures, even in the most developed nations. The 
U.S., Europe, and Australia, for example, have built massive systems of 
detention centers to house migrants arriving at their borders. States have 
also adopted creative measures to comply with the letter of non-
refoulement. For example, to restrict migration, Western states have 
employed restrictive visa requirements, carrier sanctions, safe third country 
designations, readmission agreements, safe zones inside conflict areas, and 
programs of interdiction at sea.14 These policies have been criticized by 
UNHCR, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on 
Refugees, for amounting to human rights violations or non-refoulement.  
 To analyze states’ obligations under non-refoulement, courts must 
confront the contested issue of when a state’s human rights obligations 
under international law apply extraterritorially. States engaged in 
interdiction at sea first encounter refugees in offshore locations. The 
question arises as to whether states are bound by non-refoulement when 
they are technically operating outside their own territory. Cases involving 
refugee rights, then, have important implications for states’ extraterritorial 
obligations under other human rights instruments. 
 
II. CASES INVOLVING NON-REFOULEMENT 
 
A.   U.S.: Sale v. Haitian Centers Council 
 
The 1993 case of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council is the only case that has 
brought the principle of non-refoulement before the U.S. Supreme Court.16 
In the 1980s and 1990s, pro-democracy Haitians involved with the 
                                                
13 GUY GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 208 
(3rd ed., 2007). 
14 Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick & Andrew Shacknove, Crisis and Cure: A Reply to 
Hathaway/Neve and Schuck, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295, 297 (1998). 
16 HCC, 509 U.S. at 155.  
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Convention for Democratic Unity movement (KID) worked to put Jean-
Bertrand Aristide in power by advocating for democratic elections in Haiti. 
In September, 1981, the U.S. and Haitian governments signed a bilateral 
agreement creating a cooperative interdiction program.17 The U.S. Coast 
Guard began interdicting Haitian vessels and interviewing the migrants 
aboard to determine whether they had credible fears of political persecution, 
and were therefore eligible for refugee status. The Coast Guard brought to 
the U.S. those who were “screened-in” and returned all others to Haiti. 
In 1990, following UN-supervised elections, Aristide was elected 
president. But democracy was short-lived. Aristide was ousted in a brutal 
coup on September 29-30, 1991. In its immediate aftermath, hundreds of 
KID supporters were killed, kidnapped, jailed, tortured, illegally detained, 
attacked with machetes, beaten, or had their property destroyed.18 
Thousands of democracy supporters fled and sought refuge in Cuba or the 
United States. Their flight was further fueled by a severe economic 
downturn after the Organization of American States instituted a trade 
embargo against Haiti to protest the coup.19  
During the six months following October 1991, the U.S. Coast 
                                                
17 Haiti-United States: Agreement to Stop Clandestine Migration of Residents of Haiti 
to the United States, 20 I.L.M. 1198 (Sept. 23, 1981); implemented by Exec. Order No. 
12,324, 46 Fed, Reg. 48,109 (Sept. 29, 1981). 
18 BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT 12 (2005). 
19 See id. 
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Guard interdicted 34,000 Haitians.20 Initially, the Coast Guard conducted 
informal exclusion hearings for the Haitians aboard U.S. cutters, pursuant to 
the 1981 agreement.21 But the sheer number of fleeing Haitians soon made 
screenings at sea impossible. After failed attempts to send Haitians to other 
Caribbean countries, the U.S. set up a makeshift camp at Guantanamo Bay 
to house Haitians while it conducted exclusion hearings.22 However, the 
facilities at Guantanamo could only accommodate 12,500 persons, and soon 
became overcrowded. On May 22, 1992, President Bush issued Executive 
Order 12807, authorizing the Coast Guard to summarily repatriate Haitians 
without screening.  
A group of these Haitians, represented by a team from Yale Law 
School led by Professor Harold Koh, sued the U.S. Government, claiming it 
had violated its own domestic immigration laws and the Convention by 
forcibly refouling them without individualized processing.23 At the heart of 
the litigation was § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which 
states: 
 
[t]he Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . to a 
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien’s life or 
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.24  
 
This provision was intentionally drafted to mirror the non-refoulement 
obligations in the Convention. 
The Haitians prevailed in the Second Circuit, and the Government 
appealed the case to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the Haitian crisis 
became a major issue in the presidential campaign between Bill Clinton and 
George Bush. While a candidate, Clinton criticized the interdiction program 
and vowed to overturn it. Once elected, upon news that Haitians were 
building boats in preparation for his inauguration, Clinton reversed course 
and endorsed the interdiction program.25 
                                                
20 HCC, 509 U.S. at 163. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 163. 
23 See Harold H. Koh & Michael J. Wishnie, The Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers 
Council: Guantanamo and Refoulement, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES, (Deena 
Hurwitz, Margaret Satterthwaite, & Douglas Ford eds., 2009). 
24 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1988 Supp. IV). 
25 See David Martin, YLS Sale Symposium: Interdiction of Asylum Seekers—The 
Realms of Policy and Law in Refugee Protection, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 15, 2014), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/15/yls-sale-symposium-interdiction-asylum-seekers-realms-
policy-law-refugee-protection/; reversal discussed in Koh & Wishnie, supra note 23, at 
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1. The Decision 
 
In an 8-1 opinion, the Supreme Court held that neither § 243(h) of the 
INA nor Article 33 of the Convention barred the U.S.’s program of 
interdiction at sea. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens first determined 
that § 243(h) limits the actions of the Attorney General only, and does not 
apply to the President or the Coast Guard.26 Second, the Court held that the 
INA applies “only to aliens who reside in or have arrived at the border of 
the U.S.,” and not extraterritorially.28 The Court cited the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in American law and the fact that the INA itself 
makes no reference to extraterritorial application.29 The Court explained 
that Congress’ choice to use both the words “return” and “deport” together 
in the 1980 Amendment demonstrates that the statute is not meant to apply 
extraterritorially, since the use of two words refers to both deportation and 
exclusion proceedings.30 
Turning to the Convention, the Court held that the U.S. did not incur 
an extraterritorial obligation by acceding to the 1967 Protocol. The Court 
found that neither Congress nor the Executive Branch explicitly mentioned 
assuming any extraterritorial obligations when the U.S. acceded to the 
Protocol, and therefore, the U.S. could not have intended to do so.32 First, 
the Court noted that Article 33.2 of the Convention contains an “explicit 
reference . . . to the country in which the alien is located.”33 If the 
prohibition against refoulement applied on the high seas, “no nation could 
invoke the second paragraph’s exception with respect to an alien there.”34 In 
the Court’s view, extraterritorial application of Article 33.1 would “create 
an absurd abnormality: dangerous aliens on the high seas would be entitled 
                                                                                                                       
398. 
26 HCC, 509 U.S. 155, 171–74 (1993). 
28 Id. at 160. 
29 See id. at 173. 
30 See id. at 174–75.  
32 Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. at 178. 
33 Id. at 179. Article 33, section 1 of the Refugee Convention reads: “No Contracting 
State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers 
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Article 33, 
section 2 of the Refugee Convention reads, “The benefit of the present provision may not, 
however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a 
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a 
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country.” 
34 HCC, 509 U.S. at 179–180. 
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to the benefits of [the prohibition against refoulement in Article 33.1] while 
those residing in the country that sought to expel them would not.”35 The 
Court thus read a geographic limitation into the prohibition against 
refoulement in Article 33.1 based on the language in Article 33.2. They 
decided that if the exception to the rule of non-refoulement is 
geographically limited to the territory of the country that the refugees are in, 
the rule must have that limitation as well. 
The Court also reasoned that Article 33.1 uses both “expel” and 
“return (‘refouler’),” and that “refouler” has a legal meaning narrower than 
its common meaning.36 “Refouler” better translates to “repulse,” “repel,” 
“drive back,” or “expel,” implying that “return,” as used in the Convention, 
“means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an 
act of transporting someone to a particular destination.”37 Thus, it concludes 
that the Protocol was not intended to apply extraterritorially. After 
interpreting the text of the INA and the Convention, the Court further 
supported its argument by looking to the Convention’s travaux 
préparatoires. Three non-U.S. drafters had stated that they did not intend 
Article 33 to apply extraterritorially.38 While nothing suggests that other 
signatories agreed with these delegates, the Court adopted their position.39  
 
2. Justice Blackmun’s Lone Dissent 
 
Justice Blackmun issued a blistering dissent rejecting the majority’s 
interpretation of both § 243(h) of the INA and especially the Convention’s 
prohibition against refoulement. Blackmun noted that the Refugee Act of 
1980 indisputably was amended to align U.S. immigration law with the 
Convention.40 The plain language of Article 33.1 does not include any 
geographical limitations. In Blackmun’s view, “The terms are 
unambiguous. Vulnerable refugees shall not be returned. The language is 
clear, and the command is straightforward; that should be the end of the 
inquiry.”41 Until this litigation, he says, “the Government consistently 
acknowledged that the Convention applied on the high seas.”42 The 
prohibition against refoulement, however translated, clearly “prohibits the 
Government’s actions.”43 He notes that the statements of the Convention’s 
                                                
35 Id. at 179–180. 
36 See id. at 180.  
37 Id. at 182. 
38 See id. at 183–87.  
39 See id. at 187. 
40 See id. at 190. 
41 Id. at 190. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 192–93.  
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drafters are “not entitled to deference, were never voted on or adopted, 
probably represent a minority view, and . . . do not address the issue in this 
case.”44  
 Similarly, Justice Blackmun found §243(h) of the INA to be 
unambiguous.45 He finds that the Coast Guard is obviously an agent of the 
Attorney General, who is bound not to return refugees.46 Moreover, by 
deleting the words “within the United States” from the pre-1980 version of 
§243(h), Congress clearly meant for it to apply extraterritorially.47 He states 
that rather than the presumption against extraterritoriality, the Court should 
have relied on the Charming Betsy canon, the idea that a Congressional act 
should never be construed to violate the law of nations if any alternative 
construction is possible.48 Invoking the Convention’s enactment in response 
to the refoulement of Jewish refugees during World War II, Blackmun ends 
on a cautionary note:  
 
The refugees attempting to escape from Haiti do not claim a right of 
admission to this country. They do not even argue that the 
Government has no right to intercept their boats. They demand only 
that the United States, land of refugees and guardian of freedom, 
cease forcibly driving them back to detention, abuse, and death. That 
is a modest plea, vindicated by the treaty and the statute. We should 
not close our ears to it. 
 
These words would inspire European justices to adopt his conclusion. 
 
3. Impact 
 
The Sale decision permits U.S. presidents to utilize interdiction at sea 
whenever it is convenient for restricting migration. In December 1993, 
Clinton agreed to change the direct return policy after intensive lobbying by 
human rights organizations. The Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights and UNHCR condemned the U.S. interdiction program.49 Despite 
this, after Aristide’s second removal from power, George W. Bush re-
instated the program.  
The U.S. interdiction at sea program is said to have inspired similar 
                                                
44 Id. at 198. 
45 See id. at 199. 
46 See id, at 200–01. 
47 Id. at 202. 
48 See id. at 207. 
49 See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No 51/96, ¶ 171, (March 
13, 1997); Brief for UNHCR as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). 
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policies in Australia and Europe. However, Australian and European courts 
have interpreted non-refoulement to expand it beyond what the U.S. 
Supreme Court requires. The ECtHR explicitly criticized the Sale decision 
in its own opinion on non-refoulement. 
 
B.  Australia: The Tampa Case 
 
Australian courts have sought to avoid reaching Australia’s 
commitments under the Convention. Their controversial human rights 
decisions take place against the backdrop of heated political debate. 
Australian policy toward “boat people” has been a major issue in national 
politics in recent decades. The proximity of its outlying islands to Southeast 
Asia makes it a convenient destination for migrants and human smugglers. 
A favorite landing spot is Christmas Island, an Australian external territory 
that lies only 360 kilometers south of Java and 2600 kilometers Northwest 
of Perth.  
 In 2001, a very controversial case reached the Federal Court of 
Australia, the highest court of appeals before the High Court. On August 26, 
2001, the MV Tampa, a Norwegian commercial ship, rescued 433 people 
from a sinking craft in international waters near Christmas Island. The 
passengers on the shoddy, overcrowded boat were mostly Afghans and Iraqi 
asylum-seekers who had been smuggled to Australia via Indonesia. The 
Tampa’s captain determined that some of the migrants needed urgent 
medical attention and sought help from Australian authorities.  
When no assistance arrived, the Tampa initially headed toward 
Indonesia, but turned for Christmas Island when five passengers threatened 
to commit suicide. 136 boats sailing from Indonesia had been allowed to 
enter Australia in the preceding 12 months, but the government refused to 
allow the Tampa to land.51 Commentators have speculated that the Liberal 
government was reluctant to allow additional asylum-seekers to enter in a 
highly visible way so close to an election.52 As one cartoonist noted, the 433 
people on the Tampa represented millions of votes.53 In the ensuing 
litigation, the government did not explain why it singled out the Tampa, but 
                                                
51 Susan Kneebone, Controlling Migration by Sea: The Australian Case, in 21 
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL 357 (Bernard Ryan & Valsamis Mitsilegas 
eds., 2010). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
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admitted that it did not want the passengers to enter Australia’s migration 
zone, where they could claim protection under the Convention.54 
The Australian Secretary of the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs determined that the passengers were the responsibility 
of Indonesia and Norway, and so refused to allow the ship to land. Instead, 
45 Australian Special Armed Services troops stormed the ship as the public 
watched. The passengers expressed to the Australian government their 
desire to seek peaceful asylum. The SAS forces responded by controlling 
the Tampa for more than a week, refusing to allow it on Australian soil, and 
even closing the harbor and cutting off communication with the passengers. 
By this time, the case had attracted international attention. UNHCR called 
the governments of Australia, Norway, and Indonesia to Geneva to try to 
broker a solution.  
When talks broke down, Australia arranged for the rescuees to be 
transferred to Nauru. No one explained this plan to the passengers in their 
native language, and no processing system was established in Nauru. On 
September 3, the passengers were transferred to an Australian ship. At this 
point, an Australian NGO filed a lawsuit on behalf of the passengers in 
Australian Federal Court, arguing that they had been unlawfully detained 
aboard the Tampa and petitioning for their right to enter Australia.  
 
                                                
54 See id. 
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1. The Decision 
 
In what became known as the “Tampa Case,” the Federal Court 
avoided the issue of non-refoulement. The court held that the Government 
must release the rescuees onto mainland Australia if they refused to go to 
Nauru or New Zealand, which had by then agreed to take some of the 
passengers. The court held that the removal of aliens is governed entirely by 
statute, namely the Migration Act of 1958, leaving no room for the exercise 
of prerogative power to remove particular aliens. Although it could easily 
have done so, the court did not address the issue of refoulement, the asylum 
claims of the rescuees, or the potential refugee claims among them. The 
Convention was not mentioned, and the plaintiffs were referred to as 
“rescuees” throughout the decision, a peculiar term that suggests the court 
wished to avoid the terms “asylum-seeker” or “refugee.”  
The decision was quickly appealed to the full Federal Court and 
became titled Ruddock v. Vadarlis.55 In the meantime, hours after the 
Federal Court’s initial decision, two airplanes struck the twin towers of the 
World Trade Center in New York, forever changing both public opinion 
and immigration policies on the entry of Afghans and Iraqis. With an 
election looming, the Liberal Government needed to curry votes by 
appearing tough on refugees.56 
On September 18, 2001, the full Federal Court overturned itself. It 
held that the Australian Minister of Immigration Affairs acted within his 
executive power under Section 61 of the Australian Constitution by 
preventing the rescuees from landing on the mainland. The Migration Act 
of 1958 did not abrogate this power. In the court’s view, Australian 
authorities did not restrict the rescuees’ freedom, since they were free to go 
to a third country. Therefore, the refugees were not detained by Australia, 
but actually had been detained by the captain of the Tampa. The odd term 
“rescuee” was again used throughout the decision. The rescuees’ asylum 
claims and the question of whether Australia had violated its obligations 
under the Convention were never mentioned. Petitioners’ appeal to the High 
Court of Australia was subsequently denied. Implicitly criticizing the 
decision, UNHCR awarded the Tampa’s captain its Nansen Refugee Award 
for outstanding work on behalf of the forcibly displaced. 
 
2. Impact 
 
 After “The Tampa Affair,” the Howard Government responded by 
                                                
55 Ruddock v. Vadarlis (2001) FCA 1329 (Austl.) 
56 Penelope Mathew, Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa, 96 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 661, 662 (2002). 
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developing the ominously named “Pacific Solution.” Commentators have 
speculated that the U.S.-Caribbean interdiction program and the Sale 
decision inspired this plan for interdiction of migrants at sea.57 Seven new 
parliamentary acts restricted the entry of aliens into Australia and validated 
all actions taken in the wake of the Tampa Affair.59 They developed a new 
category of territory, the “excise offshore place,” which included territories 
outside the mainland like Christmas Island. An unlawful alien entering via 
an excise offshore place would now be identified as an “offshore entry 
person” and prohibited from submitting a valid visa application unless the 
Minister of Immigration deems it in the public interest for them to do so. 
Authorized by the legislature, the Australian Defense Forces introduced 
Operation Reflex to interdict boats carrying potential asylum-seekers before 
they reached Australian territory. The acts also allowed Australia to identify 
other countries where they could redirect offshore entry persons. Sending 
asylum-seekers to a safe, third country does not violate the principle of non-
refoulement if the third country is safe for migrants and no danger of 
refoulement exists there. Australia has identified Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea, and recently Cambodia, as places to send asylum-seekers, despite 
protests from human rights groups that conditions there are unsatisfactory. 
Once in these third countries, Australia’s Migration Act no longer applies, 
so aliens could submit a valid visa application. However, these aliens would 
be limited to certain visa categories and unable to apply for a protection 
visa. In other words, asylum-seekers directed to third countries would never 
receive refugee status in Australia. 
After the 2008 election, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s Labor 
government suspended the Pacific Solution, although migration had 
dropped dramatically during the years it had been in effect, per the figure 
above.60 While the policy was suspended, the High Court of Australia 
clarified the rights of asylum-seekers under the Pacific Solution. In the M61 
Case, the Court held that asylum-seekers detained in excised offshore places 
are individuals to whom Australia owes protection, and therefore are 
entitled to procedural fairness and access to courts.61 In M70, the High 
                                                
57 See id. at 666. 
59 Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) 
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Court held that two offshore entry persons who claimed to be refugees 
under the Convention could not be released to Malaysia without processing 
of their refugee claims in Australia.62 The Court reasoned that the Minister 
of Immigration did not have the power to enter into an agreement with 
Malaysia to release asylum-seekers there, since Australia could not ensure 
that Malaysia would give adequate and fair protection to asylum-seekers. 
Therefore, sending asylum-seekers to Malaysia would potentially violate 
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.  
In the wake of an influx of boat people and a number of publicized 
deaths at sea, the succeeding Labor government reinvigorated the Pacific 
Solution, reopening the Nauru and Manus Island detention centers for 
offshore processing of asylum-seekers, striking a new agreement with 
Papua New Guinea for third-country processing and giving unauthorized 
maritime arrivals no possibility of obtaining Australian residency. Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott defeated Kevin Rudd in 2014 on a campaign promise 
to “stop the boats.”  
So far, the High Court has largely upheld Abbott’s policies 
regarding asylum-seekers, although they have come under fire domestically 
and internationally. In January 2015, the High Court upheld Australia’s 
interdiction of 157 Sri Lankan asylum-seekers and subsequent transfer to 
Nauru.64 The court held that interdiction at sea and third country-processing 
were legal under the Maritime Powers Act, but that Australia was bound to 
ensure the asylum-seekers’ safety in any country to which they were 
transferred. The court declined to reach the question of Australia’s non-
refoulement obligations, but several justices raised concerns about the 
practice of summary return. The court also left open the question of whether 
the Australian government has the power to turn back the boats. UNHCR 
promptly criticized the decision.65 Another case set to come before the 
Court seeks to have the Australian government’s agreement for third-
country processing in Papua New Guinea declared unconstitutional. If 
successful, this case has the potential to invalidate Australia’s entire 
offshore processing program.66  
 Thus, in the wake of Ruddock v. Vadarlis, Australia has continued to 
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seekers-launch-high-court-challenge/6471376. 
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experiment with migration-control policies involving interdiction at sea and 
extraterritorial processing by third countries. Its High Court has repeatedly 
held that Australia’s non-refoulement obligations extend to ensuring that 
third countries will not subject asylum-seekers to ill-treatment and will not 
refoule them. However, Ruddock still stands, and neither the Australian 
Federal nor High Court has addressed whether Australia’s interdiction at 
sea practices conflict with its non-refoulement obligations, despite repeated 
opportunities to do so.  
 
C.  ECHR: Hirsi Jamaa and M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece 
 
Faced with a recent influx of asylum-seekers crossing the Mediterranean, 
Europe has sought to restrict its borders. In 2003, the European Union 
enacted the Dublin Agreement, designed to discourage migration by 
sending asylum-seekers back to their country of entry within Europe for 
processing.69 In 2004, the European Union also created an extensive border 
patrol agency called Frontex.70 NGOs have repeatedly accused Frontex of 
non-refoulement for its interdiction and return of migrants at sea.71  
Southern European states, particularly Italy and Greece, are the most 
frequent points of entry for migrants. Both have built massive detention 
centers to house asylum-seekers while they await processing. UNHCR and 
NGOs have criticized Greece, in particular, for lengthy processing times 
and unsafe conditions for asylum-seekers. Cases against Italy and Greece 
involving improper treatment of asylum-seekers have come before the 
ECtHR.  
The ECtHR interprets non-refoulement more liberally than courts in 
the U.S. and Australia. Since the European Union itself is not a signatory to 
the Convention, the ECtHR cannot consider violations of non-refoulement. 
However, Article 3 of the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) 
prohibits the related practices of torture and inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. In 2011, the ECtHR issued a decision similar to 
that of the Australian High Court in M70 in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece.73 Belgium had sent an asylum-seeker back to Greece, his point of 
first entry to Europe, without ensuring that Greece would adequately protect 
him, process his claims, and not put him at risk for refoulement. The 
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ECtHR held that both Belgium and Greece were responsible for violations 
under Article 3 of the ECHR. In doing so, the ECtHR effectively held that 
Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits refoulement. 
One year later, the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy became 
the first ECtHR case involving the interdiction of migrants at sea.74 In 2008, 
Italy and Libya signed a Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation 
that included provisions for mutual assistance in fighting irregular 
migration.75 Italy and Libya agreed to joint operations in the Mediterranean 
to interdict and return boats carrying illegal migrants.76 Data from Italian 
immigration officials shows that the number of irregular migrants arriving 
from North Africa decreased since this Treaty was adopted.77  
Human rights organizations decried Italy’s interdiction practices.78 
NGOs argued that the policy subjected returned migrants to ill treatment in 
Libya, amounting to a violation of ECHR Article 3.79 Further, Italian 
authorities have openly acknowledged that they do not engage in formal 
identification and processing of migrants intercepted at sea.80 Italian 
officials conducted these practices even though Article 4 of the ECHR’s 
Protocol No. 4 bans collective expulsion of aliens. 
 
1. The Decision 
 
In 2009, eleven Somali nationals and thirteen Eritrean nationals 
brought suit before the ECtHR alleging violation of these two articles of the 
ECHR. The migrants had been among two hundred individuals aboard three 
vessels crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya.81 On May 6, 2009, the 
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81 See Jamaa, at §9. 
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Italian police and coast guard intercepted them in international waters 
approximately 35 nautical miles south of Lampedusa. The forces transferred 
them to military ships, where their personal effects and identity documents 
were confiscated. Ten hours later, the Italian forces turned the migrants over 
to the Libyan authorities in the Port of Tripoli.82 Aboard the ship, Italian 
officials did not attempt to identify, interview, or process the migrants; nor 
did they inform them of their destination before returning them to Libya.83  
Two of the applicants later died “in unknown circumstances.” 
Fourteen others were granted refugee status by UNHCR offices in Tripoli, 
and brought suit before the ECtHR. The applicants argued that Article 3 of 
the ECHR and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 required Italy to allow them to 
make a claim for asylum and to review their claims on an individual basis, 
and prohibited Italy from returning them to a state where they might be 
subject to mistreatment.84 The applicants further argued that they were 
arbitrarily refouled, and had been denied the opportunity to challenge their 
refoulement or seek refugee protection under international law.  
The applicants first had to prove that they had standing before the 
ECtHR because they were interdicted on the high seas. They brought suit 
under Article 34 of the ECHR, which permits “applications from any 
person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to 
be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties.” Italy 
argued that its actions were not subject to the ECHR because they occurred 
outside of Italian territory and because Italy did not exert absolute and 
excessive control over the applicants since they did not use force.85 
Moreover, they did not involve a “maritime police action” because they 
were simply rendering the humanitarian aid required by the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue.86  
The Court held that the case fell within its jurisdiction and that the 
migrants had standing. Relying on a standard developed in other cases 
involving extraterritoriality, the Court held that Italy had exerted “effective 
control” over the migrants’ craft, and over the migrants itself when they 
took them aboard the military vessel flying the Italian flag.87 The alleged 
violations took place entirely aboard the Italian ships. Thus, the fact that 
they were intercepted on the high seas did not remove them from 
                                                
82 See id. at §§ 10–12. 
83 See id. at § 11. 
84 See id. at §§ 84–88. 
85 See id. at § 64. 
86 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 3.  
87 Jamaa, at § 64. 
18 When Law Migrates [23-Jul-15 
jurisdiction.88 Regarding Italy’s UNCLOS argument, the Court pointedly 
stated that Italy could not “circumvent its ‘jurisdiction’ under the 
Convention by describing the events at issue as rescue operations . . . .”89  
Moving to the merits, the Court found that Italy violated Article 3 
and Article 13 of the ECHR and Article 4 of the Protocol. The Court found 
Italy violated Article 3 by returning the migrants to Libya, where they were 
at risk of inhuman and degrading treatment. Moreover, in Libya they would 
be exposed to the risk of repatriation to Somalia and Eritrea, where they 
would likely be subjected to maltreatment.90 The Court stressed that 
“expulsion, extradition or any other measure to remove an alien may give 
rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of the 
expelling state under the Convention.” It affirmed the “absolute character” 
of the prohibition against torture and inhuman and degrading treatment 
under Article 3. The Court concluded that, given numerous reports by 
international organizations, states, and NGOs regarding the lack of safety in 
Libya, Italy “knew or should have known” that the migrants could be 
exposed to maltreatment, in violation of Article 3. The Court further held 
that Italy had violated Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 by not allowing the 
migrants to make asylum claims or receive individual consideration, which 
constituted an illegal collective expulsion of aliens.91 Finally, the court held 
that Italy violated Article 13 of the Convention, since the applicants did not 
have an effective remedy or procedural process that they could pursue after 
the incident occurred. The migrants were denied the protections of Article 
13 because they were offered no processing aboard the Italian ships, and 
were not informed of their destination before they were returned to Libya.  
The majority opinion hearkened back to Justice Blackmun’s dissent 
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, stating: 
 
The words of Justice Blackmun are so inspiring that they should 
not be forgotten. Refugees attempting to escape Africa do not claim 
a right of admission to Europe. They demand only that Europe, the 
cradle of human rights idealism and the birthplace of the rule of law, 
cease closing its doors to people in despair who have fled from 
arbitrariness and brutality. That is a very modest plea, vindicated by 
the European Convention on Human Rights. ‘We should not close 
our ears to it.’ 
 
With that, the ECtHR issued a landmark decision in human rights law. 
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The concurring opinion, issued by Justice Pinto de Albuquerque, directly 
discussed the principle of non-refoulement in relation to the ECHR. He 
argued that that neither migrants nor refugees should be subject to non-
refoulement. The justice stated that the prohibition against refoulement was 
“an absolute obligation of all states” and a jus cogens norm. Moreover, he 
argued “de jure refugees” deserved the same protection as “de facto 
refugees,” since all share equivalent needs for international protection. Any 
difference of treatment between these two groups of refugees, or between 
refugees arriving individually or as part of a mass influx, would create a 
second class of refugees, subject to a discriminatory regime.  
 
2. Impact 
 
Hirsi Jamaa represents a landmark ruling in at least two respects. By 
holding that interdictions at sea fall within a state’s jurisdiction, the Court 
effectively outlawed many contemporary European migrant interdiction 
practices. Interdiction at sea might still be possible in cases permitted by the 
law of the sea, but states may no longer refuse to process migrants, 
summarily repatriate them to a third country without ensuring their safety, 
or hide behind claims of impossibility due to mass influx. Also, migrants 
must now be able to challenge the decision to transfer them to another state. 
The second notable outcome of the Court’s holding was its discrete 
pronouncement that Italy could not circumvent its ECHR obligations by 
arguing that it was only acting pursuant to obligations imposed on it by 
UNCLOS. Specifically, Italy is now foreclosed from using its bilateral 
migration agreement with Libya as a legal shield from its ECHR 
commitments. More broadly, this holding forecloses future reliance by 
European states on multilateral agreements or bilateral treaties to 
circumvent their obligations to incoming migrants. It also prohibits states 
from claiming they are engaging in humanitarian “rescue-at-sea” missions 
when in reality intercepting and turning back migrants. To comply with 
their obligations under the ECHR, member states must offer individual 
processing to migrants intercepted at sea.  
Moreover, the decision implies that the obligation against non-
refoulement applies to migrants and not just to de jure refugees.92 The 
decision refers to “persons,” “applicants,” or “migrants”; nothing in it 
suggests that its prohibitions should not apply to all persons equally. The 
opinion implies that a state cannot apply lower standards to the treatment of 
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economic migrants or any other category of migrant.93  
In response to the decision, the European Parliament developed new 
legislation explicitly adding the protection against non-refoulement and the 
protection of fundamental rights to its rules governing maritime surveillance 
operations by Frontex.95 The new Regulation states that no one can be 
“disembarked in, forced to enter, conducted to or otherwise handed over to” 
an unsafe country where he or she would be at risk of the death penalty, 
torture, persecution, or other inhuman or degrading treatment, or where “the 
migrant’s life or freedom would be threatened” on Refugee Convention 
grounds, as well as sexual orientation.96 The Regulation also banned “chain 
refoulement”: a migrant cannot be handed over to a third country if that 
country itself would put the migrant at risk for refoulement. Reflecting the 
judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the Regulation says that the 
Member State must consider the situation in the third country regarding 
safety for migrants and risk of chain refoulement before deciding whether to 
send a migrant there. The Regulation also grants the migrants certain 
procedural rights, stating that before any return to a third state the Member 
States must “use all means” to identify the migrants, assess their 
circumstances, inform them of their destination, and give them an 
opportunity to object and assert the non-refoulement rule.  
It is unclear whether the ECtHR’s rulings have been followed by all 
states, even before the Mediterranean migration crises of 2014 and 2015.97 
Still, in principle, this landmark judgment could serve as guidance for other 
states to revise their enforcement of domestic migration laws to comply 
with international legal principles. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 International refugee law is meant to be universally applicable, and 
its protection against refoulement absolute. However, the requirement of 
non-refoulement has been interpreted differently in different courts, making 
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it unclear what the principle actually means. A human rights regime cannot 
be universal if it means different things in different places. When people 
migrate, they deserve the same human rights protections wherever they may 
go. But when law migrates, it may never be the same. 
As the analysis above shows, courts in the U.S., Europe, and 
Australia do not agree what the obligation of non-refoulement means. The 
ECtHR and the Australian High Court say that non-refoulement requires the 
state of entry to ensure that moving an asylum-seeker to a third country will 
not put him in danger of persecution, maltreatment, or refoulement in that 
country. Nothing in U.S. law contradicts this principle, although the issue 
has not come before SCOTUS. However, SCOTUS (explicitly) and the 
Australian High and Federal Courts (implicitly) have allowed the summary 
return of refugees interdicted at sea. The ECtHR, meanwhile, has struck 
down the practice of summary returns.   
What explains the divergence in these three opinions? The political 
context surrounding the decisions may provide some explanation for the 
courts’ different interpretations of non-refoulement. In the U.S. and 
Australia, public opinion was either neutral or against the entry of large 
numbers of boat people. Europe, on the other hand, has come under 
criticism for its treatment of migrants. Recent upheavals in the Middle East 
have led to large influxes of migrants approaching Europe by sea. Many 
highly visible cases in which migrants have drowned crossing the 
Mediterranean have caused backlash in public opinion. In this context, the 
ECtHR decided Hirsi Jamaa, broadening the interpretation of non-
refoulement and requiring greater human rights protections for migrants.  
The ECtHR’s more expansive interpretation of non-refoulement can 
also be explained by its unique position as a tribunal. Unlike any courts in 
the U.S. and Australia, the ECtHR is a supranational court that is explicitly 
charged with enforcing and implementing a human rights convention. The 
ECtHR is therefore insulated from the political pressures in any single 
country. Its explicit mission to protect human rights would also weigh on 
the side of expanding human rights protections. 
Analysis of these three cases provides guidance for nations seeking 
to apply migration controls that also comply with human rights norms. In 
the years since the SCOTUS decision in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 
the prohibition against refoulement has been increasingly recognized as an 
international legal obligation, as evidenced in the ECtHR cases and the 
Australian M70 case discussed above. Given the expanding definition of 
non-refoulement outside the U.S. and domestic and international criticism 
of Sale, another SCOTUS opinion explicitly permitting summary return of 
refugees seems unlikely. Still, Sale stands, the Australian and (pre-Hirsi 
Jamaa) European interdiction programs were modeled after the U.S. 
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program it upheld. The Australian High Court will soon hear a direct 
challenge to its program of interdiction at sea that will have important 
repercussions for state practice elsewhere. If the High Court strikes down 
the program, the U.S. will become still more of an outlier in its human 
rights practices, and it and other countries employing summary returns will 
face increased pressure to stop. 
Taken together, these decisions reveal the importance of 
international refugee law, especially the norm of non-refoulement, in 
affecting states’ migration regulations. State practice of shifting migration 
control to the high seas or third countries to avoid triggering Convention 
protections shows that the norm of non-refoulement affects state action. 
Although the U.S. and Australian courts appear to narrow the concept of 
non-refoulement or ignore it, the actions of these states reveal how 
influential the concept has been. If states felt they could simply disregard 
international refugee law, they would not need to adopt expensive and 
complicated practices to avoid it. It is no surprise, then, that states fear that 
courts will take non-refoulement too far.  
Future court cases will need to clarify the meaning of non-
refoulement. Overextension of non-refoulement may conflict with other 
national security and human rights concerns. Under the broadest 
interpretation of the prohibition against non-refoulement on the high seas, 
practically anyone on a boat interdicted at sea could claim asylum to receive 
at least temporary international protection. Anti-piracy programs have 
already been restrained because states fear that non-refoulement obligations 
will require them to protect pirates against return to their home countries.99 
Given such quandaries involving the appropriate balance between non-
refoulement and national security, David Martin has argued that 
governments need discretion to adjust to rapidly changing circumstances 
and balance human rights protections with manageable migration 
policies.100 Future decisions must clarify states’ non-refoulement 
obligations and guide them in striking an appropriate balance. 
Faced with increasing migration and asylum applications, states will 
likely continue to adopt creative policies to circumvent their non-
refoulement obligations. UNHCR has expressed that processing of asylum-
seekers within the territory of the intercepting state is strongly preferable to 
extraterritorial processing for human rights reasons.101 However, 
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extraterritorial screening or processing of asylum-seekers may be 
permissible, particularly when part of a burden-sharing arrangement to 
distribute the responsibilities of refugee protection. Third state processing, 
out of country processing, regional processing, and processing involving 
maritime vessels may all be permissible if they comply with the norm of 
non-refoulement and ensure that any third countries involved comply with 
generally accepted international human rights standards. The decisions in 
the ECtHR and Australian cases suggest that the “effective control” 
standard announced by the ECtHR may apply to migration control or other 
extraterritorial operations involving potential human rights violations. 
UNHCR views the “effective control” standard as now generally recognized 
as a norm in refugee law, and it is recognized as a standard in human rights 
cases more generally, with the U.S. being an outlier.102 Cases involving 
whether states comply with these human rights norms are likely to continue 
to come before high courts, including in the U.S., which can be said to have 
“effective control” over many areas in which its military operates, on the 
high seas and elsewhere. If these cases are used as precedent in cases 
involving U.S. military operations, the U.S. will be required to apply 
international human rights standards extraterritorially.  
Beyond the non-refoulement context, cases involving interdiction at 
sea add to our understanding of jurisprudence on human rights overall.105 
The question of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties and 
domestic human rights guarantees has been an important and controversial 
issue in recent years. The EU has been called upon to provide human rights 
guarantees for both refugees and migrants who reach their borders by sea, 
and the Hirsi Jamaa decision suggests Europe should not distinguish 
between them. States increasingly conduct activities beyond their borders, 
from migration controls to targeted killings and activities involving military 
occupation or humanitarian intervention. The European and Australian 
judgments come at a time when domestic courts are looking to ensure 
accountability under domestic law for the extraterritorial actions of states, 
as evidenced in the recent Al-Skeini judgment in Europe106 and in 
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constitutional judgments in the U.S. holding that international legal 
obligations and procedural rights guaranteed under the Constitution apply to 
the U.S.’s extraterritorial actions.107 The above cases suggest that 
international human rights guarantees extend beyond state borders to areas 
where states have effective control, and apply to non-citizens. The reach of 
these holdings, therefore, may soon migrate to other areas of human rights 
law. 
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